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Abstract
This study investigates recent developments in
Tanzania’s electric power generation to understand
how to facilitate investment in the sector. Interviews
were conducted with key public and private stake-
holders; utility data was analysed and critical sec-
ondary source documents were reviewed. All inter-
view data was triangulated to ensure integrity of
findings. It was concluded that investment in the
sector is suboptimal due to a lack of coherent plan-
ning; of processes related to contract negotiation;
and of a commitment to contract with independent
power projects. Research and analysis is limited to
generation, but there are also implications for the
distribution sector. The value of the findings extends
beyond Tanzania across Africa and to other devel-
oping regions, where countries struggle to attract
investment into electric power generation. 
Keywords: private power investment; East Africa;
regulation; power sector reform
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1. Introduction
Tanzania has a vast array of conventional and
renewable energy resources, and yet the country
struggles to generate sufficient power to fuel growth
and development. In 2016, it had approximately 1
500 megawatts (MW) in installed generation.
Network failures undermined what little power is
produced. As a result, approximately 46 percent of
the nation’s total power consumption was from off-
grid, self-generation (averaging USD 0.35/kWh)
(National Key Result Area Energy, 2013). What has
prevented Tanzania from harnessing more of its
domestic resources in an economically efficient
way, and what can be done differently going for-
ward? There appear to be three key elements that
directly affect Tanzania’s electricity supply industry
and generation procurement: coherent and up-to-
date planning; the planning and procurement
nexus, including the allocation of public and private
generation projects; and a lack of sustained com-
mitment to private sector investment and competi-
tive bidding practices. 
The first section of the paper provides a brief
overview of the drivers for power sector reform and
their results, followed by a description of how the
Tanzanian sector developed. Then the current struc-
ture and capacity is described, together with prices
and plant performance data. In subsequent sec-
tions, the analysis focuses on how capacity was pro-
cured and financed in both public and independent
power projects (IPPs), as well as future plans.
Finally, conclusions are drawn about fundamental
elements that have contributed to and detracted
from power generation development in Tanzania,
and about what is needed going forward.
2. Power sector reform: Impetus and results
At the beginning of the 1990s, nearly all major
power generation in Africa was financed from pub-
lic coffers, including concessionary loans from
development finance institutions. These publicly
financed generation assets were considered one of
the core elements in state-owned, vertically inte-
grated power systems. In the early 1990s, however,
a confluence of factors brought about a significant
change. With the main drivers identified as insuffi-
cient public funds for new generation and decades
of sub-standard performance by state-run utilities,
African countries began to adopt a new ‘standard’
model for their power systems, influenced by pio-
neering reformers in the United States of America,
the United Kingdom, Chile and Norway (Clark et
al., 2005; Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008). Urged on
by multilateral and bilateral development institu-
tions like the World Bank, which largely withdrew
from funding state-owned projects, several coun-
tries adopted plans to unbundle their power sys-
tems and introduce private participation and com-
petition (Eberhard & Gratwick, 2011). IPPs - name-
ly, privately financed, greenfield generation, sup-
ported by non-recourse or limited recourse loans,
with long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs)
with the state utility or another off-taker – became a
priority within overall power sector reform (World
Bank, 1993: 45, 51; World Bank and USAID, 1994:
1). The IPPs were considered a solution to persis-
tent supply constraints and could also potentially
serve to benchmark state-owned supply and gradu-
ally introduce competition (APEC Energy Working
Group, 1997). The IPPs could be undertaken
before sector unbundling. An independent regulator
was also not a prerequisite, since the PPA laid down
a form of regulation by contract. (More information
on the drivers of power sector reform in Africa is
available in a supplementary file.1)
With the original drivers for market reform still
present, especially in Tanzania, private sector
involvement appears inevitable in the future.
Subsequent sections delve in to Tanzania’s power
sector present and recent past to shed light on how
to improve performance and investment in the
country’s generation. 
3. Tanzania’s electricity sector: An overview
3.1 Power sector reforms
The vertically integrated, state-owned Tanzania
Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) performed
adequately in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s,
electric supply and distribution began to deteriorate
and has remained poor ever since. Repeated
attempts at reform, targeting the utility’s poor per-
formance. started in the early 1990s. In 1992, a
National Energy Policy was formulated that opened
the sector to private participation, including a pro-
vision to encourage private electricity generation
and distribution in areas where TANESCO had not
established a public power supply system. The next
year, bids were invited for the country’s first IPPs.
Following this push, in 1997, TANESCO was ear-
marked for privatization. Under pressure from the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund,
these efforts intensified from 1999, and included a
doubling of nominal tariffs. 
By 2001, with electricity costs relatively high, the
quality and reliability of supply still poor, and the
financial standing of the state utility persistently
weak, attention focused on TANESCO’s manage-
ment. In that year, the government of Tanzania
reconstituted TANESCO’s board and initiated a
management contract that was set up to last two
years, starting in 2002 but ended up spanning four
years (Clark et al., 2005; Kapika & Eberhard,
2013). While TANESCO’s balance sheet improved
under the management contract, specifically
because of better collection, the quality and reliabil-
ity of supply and the rate of new electricity connec-
tions did not increase materially, mainly because of
underinvestment (Ghanadan and Eberhard, 2007:
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23). Then, in 2005, an incoming administration
reversed plans and delisted TANESCO from privati-
sation, in direct opposition to an underlying objec-
tive of the management contract. In 2006, the gov-
ernment announced that the management contract
would not be extended, a decision that met with
wide public approval. 
Two years later, in 2008, the Electricity Act was
passed, updating the 1957 Electricity Ordinance
Amendment, which had until then governed the
sector. With respect to the structure of the electricity
industry, Clause 4(1) of the Act states:
The Minister shall provide supervis[ion] and
oversight in the electricity supply industry and
shall in that respect . . . take all measures nec-
essary to reorganise and restructure the elec-
tricity supply industry with a view to attracting
private sector and other participation, in such
parts of the industry, [in] phases or time frames
as he deems proper. 
After nearly two decades of reforms characterised
by a fluctuating commitment to private sector par-
ticipation, the Electricity Act of 2008 appeared to
signal a renewal of the government’s commitment
to reform the sector, albeit in part at the insistence
of the donor community (as had been the case for
the duration of the reforms). 
In 2011–12, however, actual practices on the
ground departed from this policy commitment, with
the procurement and installation of many emergen-
cy power plants (EPPs), with a combined capacity
of 205 MW, and a push for four state-owned power
projects. While privately owned, the EPPs worked
contrary to the goals of competition and reform,
and aggravated TANESCO’s financial situation
again (Kapika & Eberhard, 2013; Eberhard et al.,
2016). TANESCO’s net loss in 2013 was USD 295
million (up from USD 112 million in 2012).
Meanwhile, accumulated losses as of 2013 stood at
USD 915 million (up from USD 620 million in
2012) (United Republic of Tanzania Audit Office
2013: 27). 
The ‘Big results now’ (BRN) initiative, which
came into effect in 2013, was rooted in the 2008
Electricity Act, which reaffirmed the goal of
unbundling and privatising the sector. According to
BRN, the mandate of the planning framework,
under Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025, was to
transform Tanzania’s future electricity landscape. By
2025, Tanzania was expected to have installed 10
000 MW, more than six times its present capacity,
which would represent a radical departure from
past supply shortages (MEM 2014: i). It is important
to note, however, that the BRN targets were aban-
doned by the government of President John
Magufuli, who was voted into office in October
2015. Targets were scaled back to 5,000 MW by
2020 and 7 000 MW by 2025.
In 2014, PriceWaterhouseCoopers also provid-
ed strategic advice related to the unbundling of
TANESCO. At the time of writing, however, there
had been virtually no progress made in unbundling
the sector, with delays attributed to associated
delays in the asset evaluation and a lack of clear
oversight of the process at the ministry of energy.
Other challenges for the sector include a lack of
transparency, as discussed in the context of two
high-profile cases (Independent Power Tanzania Ltd
(IPTL) and Richmond/Dowans) in the supplemen-
tary file, and what private investors have repeatedly
described as the favouring of publicly funded pro-
jects over private investment. Future developments
are likely to see all private projects undertaken as
public-private partnerships (PPPs); meanwhile, all
new long-term projects in recent years were built
and owned by TANESCO (despite, it should be
emphasised, TANESCO’s precarious financial situa-
tion) rather than the private sector. Furthermore,
despite regulatory statutes that encourage a com-
petitive approach, competitive arrangements were
seldom the norm in doing business with the private
sector. 
What factors explain the country’s shifts toward
and away from private investment and reform mea-
sures; and the disconnection between adopted pol-
icy and actual practices on the ground? Part of this
disconnect may be attributed to the fact that the
numerous state actors involved are not united in
their policy positions and approaches, and various
factions have at times worked against one another
(Kapika & Eberhard, 2013; Eberhard et al., 2016). 
Finally, it is worth noting that, while feed-in tar-
iffs are under discussion, there are at present no
specific incentives for large-scale renewable pro-
jects. 
3.2 The sector’s structure and institutions
Notwithstanding the ambitious reforms envisioned
for the electricity sector, its present structure (Figure
1) continues to be characterised by a poor-perform-
ing, vertically integrated, state-owned utility (whose
attempts to contract IPPs are sporadic and not
always successful), and the prominence of non-
transparent deals. The government, through the
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), is respon-
sible for formulating energy policy. A statute dic-
tates that the regulation of the sector be conducted
by an independent regulatory agency, the Energy
and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA).
However, as will be discussed in more detail,
EWURA has not always been emboldened to carry
out the regulation that is its mandate. 
At the industry level, all the defining features of
a hybrid electricity market are visible (Gratwick and
Eberhard, 2008). TANESCO dominates the sector,
while IPPs (Songas and Independent Power
Tanzania ) provide additional generation capacity,
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together with Mwenga hydropower, Tanganyika
Planting Corporation, Tanwat, and Ngombeni
through small power projects. While TANESCO
remains the dominant player, Songas (see supple-
mentary file) supplies between 20 and 25 percent of
grid electricity, as seen in the next section. 
3.3 Power sector processes
TANESCO and EWURA have advisory and support
roles, while the MEM is responsible for power plan-
ning. This has largely been an ad hoc arrangement
to address performance issues within the MEM and
across the planning process. It presents several chal-
lenges, including the fact that TANESCO takes part
in sector planning, while simultaneously retaining
an interest in building its own new power stations.
The planning process is characterised by politics
rather than impartial and sound (near- and long-
term) decisions based on outside data sources. The
Electricity Act of 2008 allocated the power system
master plan to an independent system operator. At
the time of writing this had not been established,
though the most recent Reform Strategy and
Roadmap stipulated that it should be done between
July 2014 and June 2015 (MEM, 2014: 42).
Noteworthy in this context is that in the past ten
years the MEM has seen five permanent secretaries,
five ministers, and several different deputy ministers
– a turnover that has had serious ramifications for
the planning and associated execution and coordi-
nation processes.
Several master plans and strategies have been
produced over the years, but they have quickly
obsolesced, and it would appear that they have not
directly informed procurement decisions. The pre-
sent Power Sector Master Plan (2012) was initially
bolstered by BRN (2013), though BRN has since
been scrapped and a new plan (supported by the
Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA) is
presently under preparation, though that too is
delayed (MEM, 2013: 11; NKRA Energy, 2013:
458). 
While TANESCO has built some generation
capacity, as described below, this has been funded
by the government; the utility has scant resources to
finance its own future projects. 
Meanwhile, numerous prospective IPP develop-
ers have entered into memoranda of understanding
with the MEM, but the ministry has limited capacity
to assess value for money or undertake the negoti-
ations necessary to bring these to fruition. As a
result, very few projects have materialised, as will
be highlighted in the discussion of IPPs. Those that
have been negotiated have been slow to reach
financial close or commissioning. Furthermore,
there has been limited application of international
competitive tendering. 
The Electricity Act gives EWURA the power to
approve the initiation of procurement of power pro-
jects. These powers have been further defined
under the Electricity (Initiation of Power Procure-
ment) Rules, with the overarching goal of discour-
aging unsolicited proposals that fall outside the
power system master plan and are not financially
viable for the state (Electricity Act [CAP 131]; see
supplementary file for more detail). EWURA is sup-
posed to review all projects in Tanzania, a principle
that is enshrined in the Electricity Rules; however, it
is not clear that the agency is sufficiently equipped
to carry out this task. While the legislation came into
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Notes:
*  All EPPs phased out as of 2016. TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
†  Symbion Ubungo signed PPA in 2016 though at the time of writing no power was being purchased,
as discussed in subsequent sections. 
Figure 1: Overview of Tanzania’s electricity sector, 2016.
effect in January 2015, negotiations over unsolicit-
ed proposals carried on in ensuing months, includ-
ing with the Kilwa IPP, a 308 MW gas-fired project
that initially was highlighted by the MEM among
near-term projects, and introduced by retired public
servants and one foreign investor. As of Q3-2016,
there is no progress to report on Kilwa. 
3.3.1 Gas: Challenges and potential
The discovery of significant offshore gas to the
south is among the most positive developments in
Tanzania in recent years (Table 1). Contingent
resources are estimated at 29 trillion cubic feet (Tcf),
although estimates of close to 50 Tcf have been
reported. 
Table 1: Onshore and offshore gas discoveries
and developments in Tanzania, 1974–2016.
(Sources: Ng’wanakilala 2014; EWURA: figures
received April 22, 2015 and October 15, 2016.)
Field Discovery GIIP Proven 
date (Tcf)* (Tcf)
Songo Songo 1974 2.5 0.880
Mnazi Bay 1982 3–5 0.262
Mkuranga 2007 0.2 0.2
Kiliwani 2008 0.07 0.027
Mtwara-Ntorya 2012 0.178 —
Deep Sea 2010–14 35.10 (2013) —
49.30 (2016) 
Total 57.25 Tcf (assum- Unknown
ing 5 Tcf Mnazi Bay)
Note: *.GIIP = gas initially in place, not proven reserves; Tcf =
trillion cubic feet.; — = not available.
In the near term, domestic gas-to-electricity pro-
jects are making use of onshore reserves in a broad-
er push to diversity resources (including hydro, gas,
coal, geothermal, solar and wind). Thereafter, the
priority for Tanzania is to develop two liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) trains from deep-sea gas for export,
entailing a commitment of 14 Tcf of gas. In the long
term, at least two further LNG trains are planned.
However, offshore gas will not flow without an
established export market, as it is too expensive and
the volumes too low in the country to justify it. Until
recently, the absence of relevant planning and time-
ly implementation (including the development of
pipeline and gas-processing infrastructure), along
with a weak investment climate, prevented
Tanzania from exploiting its gas potential. Instead,
the country plugged shortages with imported and
costly diesel-fired EPPs, which have since been
phased out. The high costs of engaging and fueling
a fleet of EPPs with imports in the past five years
(for 2012 alone, EPP costs were estimated to be
USD 320 million) effectively bankrupted TANESCO.
Government support for TANESCO in this period
was sporadic, and insufficient to keep it liquid. As a
result, TANESCO stopped paying the IPPs, EPPs,
and some of their fuel suppliers. With funding
obtained from donors and commercial lenders,
TANESCO is beginning to recover from this finan-
cial shock, but until recently owed large arrears to
the sector (estimated to be up to USD 300 million).
The government is presently finalising its natural
gas utilisation master plan, which is expected to be
updated annually.
3.4 Installed generation capacity
As of 2016, Tanzania’s total installed generation
capacity was 1.474 MW, including 561 MW of
hydropower (38 percent), 717 MW of natural-gas-
fired power plants (49 percent), and 495 MW of liq-
uid-fuel power plants (12 percent), of which 53.6
MW is off-grid (Table 2). A further small amount –
less than 1 percent of Tanzania’s power – is import-
ed from Uganda, Zambia, and Kenya. The current
profile is dramatically different from that of the
recent past. Between 1980 and 2000, much of the
supply was state-owned hydropower.
Several additional observations are noteworthy.
Four of the abovenoted EPPs/rentals (Aggreko
Tegeta, Aggreko Ubungo, Symbion Arusha,
Symbion Dodoma) have since been retired; howev-
er, during their tenure they made a significant
impact on TANESCO’s balance sheet and became
synonymous with ‘private power’. The fifth EPP,
Symbion Ubungo is, as of end 2016, producing no
power (though the facilities are still in place and it is
included in total capacity above). They were includ-
ed above to draw attention to their recent historical
role, which influenced the power landscape and
also the perception of private power.
3.5 Power sector performance
The performance of the sector is also critical to eval-
uating both private and public-sector generation.
This analysis has implications for the revised goal of
5 000 MW by 2020 and sector unbundling. It
should be reiterated at the outset that, while
TANESCO is breaking away from its spiral of debt,
its financial situation has been dire (with arrears
running into the millions of dollars), which has been
a significant barrier to attracting new investors
through transparent channels.
3.5.1 Electricity produced
The actual units generated in 2015 reflect the dom-
inant role of TANESCO (58 percent), albeit also the
important role IPPs continue to play, with Songas
IPP the largest contributor (23 percent of the total
33 percent in IPP electricity production). 
3.5.2 Electricity prices
The average 2016 cost per kilowatt-hour was TZS
272/kWh (which reflects a tariff reduction from
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Table 2: Grid-connected capacity in Tanzania, as of 2016. (Source: MEM 2013: 16; data received
from TANESCO: November 14, 2014; January 9, 2015; EWURA: October 20, 2016.)
Name Ownership Installed Retire Fuel Installed capacity 
(MW)
Hale TANESCO 1967 2017 Hydro 21
Nyumba ya Mungu TANESCO 1968 2018 Hydro 8
Kidatu TANESCO 1975 2025 Hydro 204
Zuzu diesel TANESCO 1980 2015 Diesel 7.4
Mtera TANESCO 1988 2038 Hydro 80
Tanwat SPP/IPP 1995 2029 Biomass 2
Pangani Falls TANESCO 1995 2045 Hydro 68
Kihansi TANESCO 2000 2050 Hydro 180
Tegeta IPTL IPP unit 2002 2021 HFO 103
Songas5 IPP unit 2004 2024 NG 38
Songas1–4 IPP unit 2004 2024 NG 114
Songas6 IPP unit 2006 2024 NG 37
Tegeta GT TANESCO 2009 2028 NG 45
TPC SPP/IPP 2010 2030 Biomass 17
Ubungo I TANESCO 2008 2026 NG 102
Aggreko Tegeta Aggreko, rental 2011 2014 Gas oil 50
Aggreko Ubungo Aggreko, rental 2011 2015 Gas oil 50
Symbion Ubungo Symbion, rental 2011 2015 converted NG/Jet 126
Mwenga SPP/IPP 2012 2030 Hydro 4
Symbion Arusha Symbion, rental 2012 2014 Diesel 50
Symbion Dodoma Symbion, rental 2012 2014 Diesel 55
Ubungo II TANESCO 2012 2031 NG 105
Nyakato/Mwanza TANESCO 2013 2038 HFO 63
Kinyerezi I TANESCO 2015-16 NG 150
Total installed capacity (-) rentals (205 MW) 1 474
Note: Off-grid and grid-connected together total 1528 MW. Grid alone accounts for 1474 MW. EPPs/rentals not included in these
totals as have since been retired. HFO = heavy fuel oil; IPP = independent power project; IPTL = Independent Power Tanzania
Ltd.; MW = megawatts; NG = natural gas; SPP = small power projects; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Company; TPC =
Tanganyika Planting Corporation. 
EPPs = emergency power plants; IPTL = Independent Power
Tanzania Ltd; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Co.
Symbion Ubungo included in EPP tally.
Figure 2: Share of grid-generated electricity
production, by type of producer: Tanzania, 2015
(TANESCO, 2016).
EPPs = emergency power plants; IPTL = Independent Power
Tanzania Ltd; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Co.
Symbion Ubungo included in EPP tally. 
Note: Excluding less than 1% in imports and small private pro-
ducers Tanwat, TPC, and Mufindi. 
Figure 3: Share of grid-generated electricity produc-
tion, by type of producer, 2012-2015. (TANESCO, 2016)
2016 (Tsh 274.9/kWh) of 1%) or approximately
USD 0.12 based on average 2016 exchange rates.
In 2015, this figure was approximately USD
0.13/kWh. Table 3 shows how each entity con-
tributes to the production and price mix. 
If EPPs are removed from Table 3, the average
cost of supply falls to approximately USD
0.10/kWh, evidence of EPPs’ impact on price.
However, such snapshots do not reflect the full real-
ity of the costs involved. In the case of TANESCO,
for which a per plant cost is not available, the per
unit cost listed in Table 3 is solely a function of
TANESCO’s running costs and does not include
depreciation or finance costs. Unlike for IPPs
(Songas and IPTL), electricity users are not paying
for any portion of the capital costs of the
TANESCO-owned plant, which are government-
subsidised. These costs are, however, still incurred
and are generally paid by taxpayers. It remains a
challenge to determine TANESCO’s actual costs,
including all capital-related expenditure and financ-
ing, and to compare these systematically with those
of private plants using similar technology at compa-
rable load factors. If the capacity charge component
of a plant’s tariff is USD 0.4/kWh at 90 percent
plant load factor (PLF), it would be USD 2.4/kWh
at 15 percent PLF; that is, the differences in head-
line tariff arising from the PLF may be substantial. 
Songas, whose contribution to generation is sec-
ond to that of TANESCO, has a different price struc-
ture. Its per kilowatt-hour all-inclusive charge comes
to approximately USD 0.05. The average variable
charge, a function of competitively priced domestic
gas, amounts to a fraction of this total cost, namely
USD 0.012–0.013/kWh; this is significantly better
than TANESCO’s running cost (Table 4). 
IPTL resembles Songas in its cost structure as a
traditional IPP, and therefore is highlighted here.
Capacity charges averaged USD 0.08/kWh from
2013-2015, almost double Songas’ total cost.
Taking into consideration differences in technology,
this figure appears to be possibly inflated (causes
associated with load factors but also with nontrans-
parent procurement will be further observed in the
next section). Of the remaining USD 0.23/kWh in
charges for IPTL, USD 0.22/kWh is accounted for
by the imported fuel variable charge, which is a
complete pass-through item. Thus, the overwhelm-
ing cost of this IPP is for fuel. While the total unit
charge for IPTL is six times greater than that of
Songas, it is on par with the running costs of
TANESCO’s Mwanza 60 MW HFO plant, which
was financed by the government and came online
in 2013. The current unit running cost of the
Mwanza plant is USD 0.23/kWh, excluding the
repayment of loans and interest, which has yet to be
finalized between TANESCO and the government
of Tanzania.
Table 4: Comparison of costs, by type of
producer, in Tanzania, 2013/5 (USD/kilowatt-
hour). (Authors’ compilation based on
correspondence with TANESCO stakeholders
(2014).)
Running/ Capacity Total
fuel cost cost cost
TANESCO 0.10 N/A N/A
Songas 0.013 0.037 0.05
Ind. Power Tanzania 0.22 0.08 0.31
Emergency power plants 0.29 0.11 0.40
Total / weighted average USD 0.13
The five EPPs contributed 16 percent of the
generation pie in 2015; however, their costs were
25 percent of the total; IPTL meanwhile, at only 10
percent of production, amounted to 25 percent of
total costs. In summary, despite incomplete data on
costs, the system was out of balance: EPPs and
IPTL accounted for an inordinate portion of costs
until recently, relative to their actual production.
This was significantly caused by imported fuel
charges. It was anticipated that if the debt incurred
by the EPPs were to be paid off, TANESCO would
break even (EWURA, per. comm., February 28,
2015).
Songas measures up to TANESCO’s plants in
relation to capacity factors and excels in terms of
lower prices, which signals some positive develop-
ments in terms of private power (but here, too, there
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Table 3: Shares/costs of capacity and generation, by type of producer, in Tanzania, 2015.
(TANESCO, 2016; Songas, 2015; EWURA, 2016)
Entity 2015 production % of production Total cost (USD) % of cost Per unit cost
TANESCO 3 472 382.55 57.97 347 238.26 44.14 0.10
Songas 1 349 195.30 22.52 67 459.77 8.19 0.05
EPPs 523 901.10 8.75 209 560.44 25.43 0.40
IPTL 644 525.70 10.76 199 802.97 25.25 0.31
Total 5 990 004.66 100.00 824 061.43 100.00 0.13
Notes:
TANESCO’s average derived cost excludes the cost of capital. EPPs = emergency power plants; IPTL = Independent Power
Tanzania Ltd.; kWh = kilowatt-hour; SPPs = small power projects; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Company. Off-grid,
imports, SPPs, (Tanwat, TPC, and Mwenga) all excluded from these tallies. The associated off-grid cost is $0.328, albeit representing
only 5 percent of the total generation.
have been issues, as mentioned briefly in the sup-
plementary file). For more information on the exist-
ing IPPs, please see the supplementary file.
3.5 Future projects, public and private 
With private developments beset with challenges
related to planning and other issues, how does the
public sphere fare, especially with a cash-strapped
utility? Is private investment being crowded out? As
mentioned earlier, TANESCO maintains a domi-
nant share in generation – 58 percent of installed
capacity, the majority of which has been built since
2000. In addition, PPPs have been identified as the
way forward, with TANESCO being a participant.
Thus, the trend has been to expand, not curtail,
state-owned assets, despite repeated calls for
increased private sector participation. In 2014, four
of the six priority generation projects in the near
term (that is, to be completed before or by 2018)
were expected to be owned by TANESCO, with
varying degrees of PPPs and associated funding;
these four projects were Kinyerezi I–IV (with recent-
ly completed Kinyerezi I, and Kinyerezi II specified
for government funding and Kinyerezi III and IV
identified for PPP funding, with Chinese partner-
ships) (Table 5). 
Of the estimated USD 1.91 billion earmarked for
investment in the generation projects noted earlier,
the government was expected to contribute USD
615 million, approximately 32 percent, of the new
capacity. Thus, while ownership of assets would be
dominated by TANESCO in the near term, funding
was to be supplemented – notably by the Chinese
(as discussed in greater detail below) and IPPs
including local IPP sponsors. 
The tariff for each of these projects has yet to be
announced. For Kinyerezi I and II, which are
financed directly by the government, the govern-
ment must determine whether there will be on-lend-
ing or equity shares provided to TANESCO.
Kinyerezi III and IV, which are PPPs, are still in
negotiations and the tariff remains undecided. It has
been indicated that for gas-fired plants the total unit
cost should not exceed USD 0.08/kWh; however,
this is highly dependent on gas prices and still does
not reflect the critical capital component, which calls
into question the true efficacy of the publicly pro-
cured plant. 
It is important to note that, as of 2015, Kinyerezi
II, III, and IV encountered delays, which still persist.
The completion date of 2018 is therefore no longer
considered realistic. The following issues have been
cited as impediments: a lack of serious developers,
a lack of funding potential, a lack of credit enhance-
ment mechanisms, the viability of the power offtak-
er (TANESCO), and the availability of certain types
of fuel (Eberhard et al., 2016).
Parallel to this expansion, the goal (at least on
the books) is to achieve retail competition and the
privatisation of TANESCO. The year 2024 has been
identified for preparing generation and distribution
companies for listing and privatizsation. Thus, state
ownership will probably continue in the near term
(albeit with a larger portion of supplementary fund-
ing), but in the longer term a phasing out of direct
public ownership and asset funding is expected.
Nonetheless, there seems to be a real disconnect
between plans and action, and the necessary buy-
in to realise the plans. 
3.6 Further gas sector and power develop-
ments: The government looks east
In the meantime, the availability (or not) of domes-
tic natural gas continues to play a pivotal role in
determining outcomes in the power sector. The
government sought private participation in the
development of the Mnazi field for over six years,
but no viable interest was found, due in part to a
low level of proven reserves in the field and a limit-
ed investment-enabling environment. Meanwhile
the Songo Songo fields were slated for expansion
by the private sector to meet the near-term needs of
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Table 5: Generation projects planned in the near term in Tanzania 
(NKRA Energy Lab, 2013; TANESCO, 2015).
Ownership Project name Capacity Tech/ Fuel Investment Funding source Status 
(MW) (USD millions) (4Q2016)
TANESCO Kinyerezi I 150 OCGT 183.3 GoT Done
TANESCO Kinyerezi II 240 CCGT 432 GoT Construction
TANESCO Kinyerezi III 300 OCGT 389.7 PPP Not started
TANESCO Kinyerezi IV 450 CCGT 400 PPP Not started
IPP Kilwa Energy 308 CCGT 365 ETG POWER, UAE Not started
IPP Singida 50 Wind 136 National Devt Corp, TANESCO, On hold
Power Pool East Africa Ltd 
IPP Wind East Africa 100 Wind 285 Aldwych, IFC, Six Telecoms Not started
Note: 210 MW OCGT cited in NKRA (2013), revised to 308 MW (2015); 210 MW is for OCGT to operate for two years, thereafter
expanded to CCGT. CCGT = combined-cycle gas turbine; ETG = Export Trading Group; GoT = Government of Tanzania; IFC =
International Finance Corporation; IPP = independent power plant; MW = megawatts; OCGT = open-cycle gas turbine; PPP =
public-private partnership; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Company; UAE = United Arab Emirates.
the country’s gas supply, approximately 50 million
standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) of gas to
power 250–300 MW (single cycle). A deal was
negotiated with Pan African Energy Tanzania Ltd,
the existing developer, for a gas infrastructure
expansion in 2011 (which had a tariff approved by
EWURA; a signed engineering, procurement, con-
struction contract; and financing arranged). 
On the cusp of the Songo Songo expansion,
Tanzania engaged China to help fund natural gas
infrastructure connecting Mnazi Bay and Songo
Songo to Dar-es-Salaam, also known as the
National Natural Gas Infrastructure Project
(NNGIP). As a result, the government put the
Songo Songo expansion on hold and focused on
the development of the Mnazi field, which was
reconfigured from a private infrastructure project to
one led by the public sector. Gas deliveries from
Songo Songo were estimated to be able to feed
(and were earmarked for) near-term power genera-
tion, even as the government sought longer-term
gas supply. This shift, from near-term Songas
expansion to the long-term NNGIP, exacerbated a
gap that was plugged in part by the continued use
of EPPs. 
The NNGIP, which includes a 532 km natural
gas pipeline from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam and
gas-processing plants, was completed in 2015 and
should be sufficient to run all the plants in an ideal
scenario. Despite its mega capacity of 784 mmscfd
(1002 mmscfd compressed), the Mtwara-Dar pipe
initially had only about 80 mmscfd of gas entering
it from Mnazi Bay for a limited period, about
enough to run 350–450 MW (that is, slightly more
than what the Songo Songo expansion could have
provided for near-term developments). While it is
expected that more reserves may be proven and
supplies increased, presently that is not part of the
gas contract. Most of the gas is expected to be con-
sumed by the existing gas turbine plants (including
Kinyerezi I, TANESCO’s Jacobsen 120 MW at
Ubungo, Siemens gas turbines, and the extended
Symbion 40–120 MW, LM6000s and TM2500s). As
of end 2016, the pipeline is utilised at 6.5 percent
and the gas processing plant, 21 percent. 
Tanzania has an impending need for more gas
to fuel new projects, but that has proven to be a
challenge to date. More information on Tanzania’s
gas sector development is in the supplementary file. 
4. Conclusions
The ‘Big results now’ initiative set a goal of achiev-
ing 10 000 MW of generation capacity by 2025,
doubling access rates, increasing efficiency, boost-
ing transparency and financial integrity, and pri-
vatising generation and distribution assets. The
plans were admirable and ambitious, but ultimately
unachievable and were scaled back. The govern-
ment repeatedly committed to reforms but was slow
to implement them and has wavered in its commit-
ment to integrate private power sustainably and
systematically. 
Generally, the sector has suffered from poor
governance. Frequent turnover at the Ministry of
Energy and Minerals has impeded consistent and
robust decision-making. Planning has become a
political exercise; coordination, which is intricately
linked to planning, has been poor; interagency
fighting has been common; and communication
among ministries, stakeholders, and donors has, on
occasion, broken down, as during the negotiation
of Songas and Independent Power Tanzania Ltd
(IPTL).
Private power and its benefits are by no means
a forgone conclusion in Tanzania. Power projects
planned in recent years have been or are going to
be built by TANESCO, or at least with significant
TANESCO participation, despite its financial situa-
tion, and private sector investment is effectively
being crowded out. The push to promote public
sector projects is not only the result of vested inter-
ests, but also of a general antipathy to private sector
participation that has at times informed decision-
making in Tanzania. 
The issues at stake go beyond the question of
private versus public sector involvement. A lack of
competitive procurement and transparent contract-
ing has resulted in costly deals and disputed con-
tracts, with large drains on time and resources.
Although Songas and IPTL run on different fuels
and are not exactly comparable, Songas is clearly
the least-cost privately owned supply option in
Tanzania; IPTL is the most expensive. IPTL power
costs six times more than Songas’ power and just a
little less than the emergency power plants’ power.
Beyond technical considerations, it is apparent that
such a large price difference between the two is pri-
marily due to a lack of competition and the disputes
that have affected IPTL procurement. Symbion is
another powerful example of a deal initially con-
tracted in a nontransparent manner, with costly and
disruptive outcomes. The Energy and Water Utilities
Regulatory Agency has been given the mandate to
reject unsolicited proposals, like IPTL, that are not
within the Power Sector Master Plan and are not
financially viable. However, negotiated deals per-
sist, and non-competitive procurement remains the
preferred method at the governing level. 
Poor planning, interagency disagreements, vest-
ed interests, and non-competitive practices have
unravelled contracts and impeded the timely pro-
curement of generation. As a result, the country was
forced to depend on emergency power plants and
expensive oil-fired generation over the past several
years. 
The supply of natural gas, which is directly tied
to electric power development, looks to be a posi-
tive story, though not without uncertainties.
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Historically, delays in expanding the gas supply
resulted in costly contingency plans, such as emer-
gency power plants, which in turn have led to finan-
cial stress for TANESCO. The lack of coordination
between expanding gas production, pipelines and
power plants continues to be a challenge, despite
the construction of the new high-volume Chinese-
funded gas pipeline. The delay of the Petroleum
(Upstream, Midstream, and Downstream) Act, final-
ly passed in July 2015, also left the gas sector with
no consistent regulation for many years. 
To address these challenges, private and public
stakeholders alike have called for a commitment to
improve governance across Tanzania’s gas and
power sectors in three focus areas. The first is to
improve the link between planning and procure-
ment/investment decisions. There have been many
instances where electricity generation plans have
not resulted in timely initiation of procurement pro-
cesses for new power with the result that power
shortages and non-transparent emergency deals
have been repeated. The second is to improve the
procurement and contract negotiating processes
carried out by the relevant government and paras-
tatal stakeholders. Competitive tenders need to be
the norm, not unsolicited offers. Developers have
also reported that contract negotiating processes are
ineffective and cumbersome, which has often led to
extensive delays or potential projects being aban-
doned. Clear, transparent processes and account-
ability for contracting with IPPs and engaging with
development financiers (including that of Chinese
ExIm) need to be prioritised. Thirdly, it is necessary
for the government to reestablish its commitment to
contracting with IPPs. Of late, most new power pro-
jects are being built as TANESCO-owned plants;
this puts the government’s commitment to attract-
ing private capital into doubt, despite repeated
statements to the contrary.
Finally, the sustainability of investment in new
power projects relies on TANESCO being a credible
and financially viable off-taker, in the absence of
further reforms that allows for direct contracts
between customers and IPPs. Efforts to improve the
performance of TANESCO and to commercialise
and unbundle the utility need to be accelerated.
It is to be hoped that a secure gas supply will be
established, putting an end to Tanzania’s costly
dependence on imported fuel. Private power has,
largely through Songas, helped benchmark the
costs and performance of state-owned generation,
and provided much needed new investment. Other
projects, such as IPTL and the emergency power
plants, have proven to be costly experiments, pri-
marily due to planning and procurement failures.
Tanzania does not have sufficient public resources
to meet all country’s future power needs. It will
need to learn the lessons of its prior engagement
with independent power producers if it is to attract
more private investment in power in the future. 
Power sector reform and independent power
producers are not ends in and of themselves.
Reform is meant to lead the way to a more sustain-
able sector which provides an increase in capacity
and more affordable, reliable electricity. Who, how
and what will lead to affordable, reliable power,
over the long term in Tanzania? This question can
be both asked and answered with the benefit of
hindsight, as highlighted in this study, and a new
path may be taken.
Note
1. Supplementary material can be found at https://jour-
nals.assaf.org.za/jesa/article/view/4389. 
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